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MARKMAN v. WESTVIEW INSTRUMENTS, INC.*
AND ITS PROCEDURAL SHOCK WAVE: THE
MARKMAN HEARING
Frank M Gasparo"
INTRODUCTION
In Markman v Westview Instruments, Inc.,' the U.S. Supreme
Court unanimously affirmed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit's decision holding that a district court judge must
construe, as a matter of law, the scope of a patent, including
specifically the meaning of its claims.2 This holding has caused a
116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
Brooklyn Law School Class of 1998. The author wishes to thank Professor
Emeritus Leo J. Raskind from the University of Minnesota Law School for his
assistance in the preparation of this Note and Brooklyn Law School Adjunct
Professor Robert C. Scheinfeld for his valuable insights. A special thanks to
Jessica M. Layton for her continual support and encouragement.
116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996). Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. originated
in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See 772 F.
Supp. 1535 (E.D. Pa. 1991). At trial, after the close of Markman's case in chief,
Westview Instruments moved for judgment as a matter of law, which the court
deferred ruling upon. Id. at 1536. Rather, the court instructed the jury that they
were to first construe the patent's claims and then decide if infringement had
occurred. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 973 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (noting the trial judge's instructions to the jury). The jury found that
Westview's device, which was used in laundries and dry cleaners, infringed
Markman's patent. Id. After hearing additional arguments following the verdict,
the court granted Westview's deferred judgment as a matter of law motion and
held that claim construction was a matter of law for the court. Markman, 772 F.
Supp. at 1536. As a result, the court interpreted the meaning of the terms in the
patent's claims and found that there was no infringement pursuant to the proper
construction. Id. at 1536-38.
2 Essentially, the claims in a patent document establish the outer boundaries
for a patentee's exclusive right to prevent others from making, using or selling
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major effect on patent litigation,3 the full extent of which is not
yet known because the interpretation of a patent's claims usually
determines which party will be victorious at trial.' Furthermore,
once the district courts take advantage of the Markman decision, it
may prove to be the needed spark for a more efficient and
expeditious patent litigation system.
While Markman demands that a patent's claims be construed by
a judge, neither the Supreme Court nor the Federal Circuit have
provided any guidance about how claim construction is to work in
practice.' As a result, many district courts have employed a new
an invention. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994).
This Note deals exclusively with utility patents. Utility patents are issued by
the Patent and Trademark Office for "any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement
thereof." Id. § 101 (1994). However, there are two other types of patents that can
be issued, namely plant patents and design patents. Plant patents are issued for
"any distinct and new variety of plant." Id. § 161 (1994). Design patents are
issued for "any new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufac-
ture." Id. § 171 (1994).
' See, e.g., Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 894 F.
Supp. 844, 857-58 (D. Del. 1995). "The Federal Circuit's decision in Markman
will undoubtedly change the face of patent litigation as it clearly did in this
case." Id. Moreover, the court in ElfAtochem stated that a "number of procedural
issues flow from [Markman]." Id. at 857. Such issues include: construing the
claims, summary judgment motions, interlocutory appeals and final orders. Id.
at 850, 857-58. See Gary M. Hoffman & John A. Wasleff, A Tale of Two Court
Cases: Markman and Hilton Davis, 13 COMPUTER LAW. 18, 21 (1996) ("The
Markman decision raises procedural questions that have yet to be answered.").
' ElfAtochem, 894 F. Supp. at 859 ("[R]esolution of the claim interpretation
issue often resolves the infringement issue .... "). See General Mills v. Hunt-
Wesson Inc., 917 F. Supp. 663, 667 (D. Minn. 1996) ("Markman makes clear
that the proper construction of a claim can make short work of the question of
infringement."), aff'd, 103 F.3d 978 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Jane Michaels & Alan N.
Stem, Under 'Markman,' The Jury Is Out in Patent Cases: High Court Ruling
Promotes Uniformity But EvisceratesJury Role-And Will Trigger Appeals, NAT'L
L.J., May 20, 1996, at C28 (noting the dependence of which party will be
victorious on the claim construction determination). For a rudimentary instance
of when claim construction determines which party will be successful on the
infringement issue, see infra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
' See generally Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1384 (holding merely that a patent's
claims be construed as a matter of law, but not offering any guidance to the
district courts about when, during the litigation, claim construction should or
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procedural step which has become known as a "Markman Trial,"6
("Markman Hearing"), at which a trial judge will determine the
meaning of a patent's claims.7 These claim construction hearings
have been wisely used by district courts as a pre-trial procedure,8
which induces efficiency by informing the parties early in a
litigation how their trial strategy should be tailored. 9 In particular,
could take place). See also Chad Indus., Inc. v. Automation Tooling Sys., Inc.,
938 F. Supp. 601, 603 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (stating that both the Federal Circuit and
Supreme Court "provided no procedural guidance for the nature of proceedings
for a pretrial construction of claims").
6 Elf Atochem, 894 F. Supp. at 850. "The 'obligation' . .. to instruct the
jury on the meaning of the words ... in a claim basically leaves a district court
with three options. The court can attempt to resolve the[se] disputes on the paper
record[,] ... can hold a trial to resolve these disputes[, or] .. .can wait until
trial and attempt to resolve claim disputes the evening before the jury must be
instructed." Id. (emphasis added). The Delaware district court determined that it
would hold a "Markman Trial" (hereinafter "Markman Hearing") and the Elf
Atochem opinion is often cited for establishing this procedure. Id.
7 For a general discussion of the Markman Hearing, see infra notes 89-97
and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 93
F.3d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that the District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio held a five-day pre-trial Markman Hearing); Chad Indus., 938
F. Supp. at 604 (providing a detailed description of what was required of the
litigants prior to and during the pre-trial hearing); Graco Children's Prods., Inc.
v. Century Prods. Co., No. CIV.A.93-6710, 1996 WL 421966, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
July 23, 1996) (holding pre-trial hearing); KLA Instruments Corp. v. Orbot Inc.,
No. C-93-20886-JW, 1996 WL 341113, at * 1 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 1996) (holding
two-day pre-trial hearing); Elf Atochem, 894 F. Supp. at 850 (holding two-day
bench trial); Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, Ltd., 906 F. Supp.
798, 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding two-day evidentiary hearing). See also WMS
Gaming Inc. v. Int'l Game Tech., No. 94-C-3062, 1996 WL 539112, at *10
(N.D. 111. Sept. 20, 1996) (stating that if the trial was not a bench trial, but rather
to be tried by a jury, then the court would have held a Markman hearing in order
to construe the patent's claims).
9 For an illustration of the different procedural options available to litigants
following a pre-trial claim construction hearing, see generally infra notes 93,
154-74 and accompanying text. To prevent the situation whereby a judge
conducts a pre-trial claim construction hearing, but the parties undergo years of
discovery only to find out on appeal that the construction was wrong, there must
be an immediate appellate review of the construction following the pre-trial
Markman Hearing. See infra notes 102-06 (discussing the need for early appellate
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the Markman Hearing has become for litigants a springboard for
alternative procedural paths, such as summary judgment motions,1"
interlocutory appeals" and settlement negotiations, 2 due to the
claim construction's inherently dispositive nature. 3 Moreover, one
district has gone even a step further than just holding Markman
Hearings by drafting patent rules dealing exclusively with discovery
prior to the hearing. 4
This Note explores the Markman Hearing and the procedural
issues surrounding it. Part I provides an introduction to patents and
the patent application process. Part II summarizes the Supreme
Court's opinion in Markman for its limited analytical guidance to
district court judges. Part III deals with the procedural junctures in
a patent infringement litigation when a trial judge can interpret the
claims, recognizing that a Markman Hearing can become a most
efficient tool for the interpretation process. Part IV focuses on the
extent of discovery prior to a Markman Hearing. This involves an
examination of both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Northern District of California's recent response to Markman in
review by the Federal Circuit).
'0 See infra notes 154-71 and accompanying text (explaining briefly the use,
and potential use, of summary judgment motions in patent infringement
litigation). Even though this Note deals solely with the summary judgment
motion, the same analysis applies to the motion for judgment as a matter of law.
See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a) (judgment as a matter of law); FED. R. Civ.
P. 56 (summary judgment). The "primary difference between the two motions
is [merely] procedural." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251
(1986). The Supreme Court in Anderson stated that the difference is that
"summary judgment motions are usually made before trial and decided on
documentary evidence, while [judgment as a matter of law motions] are made at
trial and decided on the evidence that has been admitted." Id. The standard used
by the courts in granting either motion is identical. Id. at 250-5 1.
' See infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text (advocating the need for
granting more interlocutory appeals as a result of the Markman decision).
12 See infra note 171 (noting the settlement option available to litigants in
an infringement suit).
"3 See supra note 4 (noting sources that state the often dispositive nature of
claim constructions).
"4 See infra notes 128-35 and accompanying text (discussing the Northern
District of California's current attempt to create local patent rules dealing with
mandatory initial disclosures prior to a claim construction hearing).
726
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promulgating local discovery rules that require mandatory disclo-
sures prior to the hearing. Part V discusses the evidence a trial
judge can utilize when construing a patent's claims during a
Markman Hearing. Moreover, it concentrates on the inefficiency
associated with the use of expert testimony at the trial stage and,
thus, the need for immediate appellate review of a claim construc-
tion to minimize any further waste of judicial resources. Part VI
examines the efficacy of granting summary judgment motions early
in a litigation, but also advances the need for courts to freely grant
interlocutory appeals to further efficiency and fairness concerns.
This Note concludes that a pre-trial Markman Hearing preceded by
extensive discovery is a landmark procedural tool that is necessary
for construing a patent's claims and should become the sole method
for a trial judge's claim construction task.
I. OVERVIEW OF A PATENT AND THE PATENTING PROCESS
Abraham Lincoln said that "the patent system added the fuel of
interest to the fire of genius."' 5 The patent system has its origins
in the U.S. Constitution, which expressly provides that Congress
shall have the power to "promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective ... Discoveries."' 6 In 1790,
President George Washington authorized the original framework for
the patent system and what would later form the Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO").' 7 Today, the PTO, through a patent
examiner, determines initially whether an invention is patentable. 8
"5 THE STORY OF THE UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE 10-11 (Patent Office,
Dep't of Commerce 1972) (quoting a speech by President Lincoln in Springfield,
Illinois on February 5, 1859).
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (n.d.)
(explaining briefly the background of the PTO and career opportunities working
as a patent examiner). See HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE
1-4 (2d ed. 1995) (Federal Judicial Center) (reviewing the historical evolution of
the patent from 500 B.C. to the 20th century).
Is SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 7-31 (explaining in detail the process that
the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") undergoes in issuing patents and the
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If a patent is issued, the patentee is granted an exclusive right
to prevent others from making, using, or selling' 9 the claimed
invention for a period expiring twenty years from the patent's filing
date.2 0 This exclusive right is granted upon successful completion
of the patent application process before a patent examiner in the
PTO, otherwise known as patent prosecution.2 ' A patent examiner
PTO's role after a patent is issued). Once an application is received by the PTO's
application division, the division sends the application to the examining group
which oversees those applications falling within a particular technical category
and class. SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 14. Next, the examining group
disseminates the inventor's application to an art group, which will then forward
it to a patent examiner. SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 14. Finally, the patent
examiner will conduct an extensive examination of the application and
correspond with the inventor in order to inform him or her of the application's
status and whether any clarifications need to be made. See generally SCHWARTZ
note 17, at 7-31 (detailing the entire patent prosecution process).
"9 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
21 Id. § 154. As a result of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, for patent
applications filed on or after June 8, 1995, the expiration of a patent's term
changed from 17 years from issuance to 20 years from the filing date. Pub. L.
No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (effective since December 8, 1994). See
MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 1.11, at 21 n.90 (2d
ed. 1995) (discussing some of the key aspects in patent law).
For patent applications filed on or after June 8, 1995, the term of a
U.S. patent begins on the date of issue and continues until the date that
is twenty years after the date on which the application that resulted in
the patent was filed or, under certain conditions, the date on which an
earlier filed application (that is referenced in the later filed application)
was filed.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 86. In contrast, for patents which have not expired
by June 8, 1995, or whose applications are still pending on June 8, 1995, the
duration is either 17 years from the date of issue or 20 years from the date of
filing, whichever is longer. SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 86 (footnote omitted).
21 SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 13-26 (explaining the prosecution process).
See Stephen G. Whiteside, Note, Patents Claiming Genetically Engineered
Inventions: A Few Thoughts on Obtaining Broad Property Rights, 30 NEW ENG.
L. REv. 1019, 1020-21 (1996) (setting out the procedure for obtaining a patent
and what protection a patent affords). There are numerous steps in the PTO's
examination process. See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 14-25 (noting
the steps a patent application may undergo until issuance). The following gives
a broad overview of the process.
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will grant a patent to an inventor only if all the statutory
requirements are met.22 First, the invention must constitute paten-
table subject matter.23 Second, the invention must be "novel[], 24
First, a patent examiner determines whether the application is clear, contains
only one invention and meets the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 111. See 35
U.S.C. § 111 (1994); SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 14. Second, a search is
conducted of the prior art to determine if the invention is barred. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 17, at 14-15. See infra notes 24, 26, 122 (discussing generally what
prior art is and the role it plays in the patent examination process). Third, the
applicant is sent an examiner's action, which includes a cover letter and written
description of the current status of the application. SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at
15. Within this action may also be a "restriction requirement" or an "election of
species requirement" if the application contained more than one invention.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 15. Moreover, the action may request clarification
of the application, reject claims, allow claims, withdraw claims, object to the
specification or note any informalities. SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 15-16.
Fourth, the applicant must respond to the action within a time period set by the
patent examiner. SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 16. This response may include
appropriate amendments to the application and "arguments designed to
distinguish the invention as claimed from any prior art applied by the examiner."
SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 16-17. Fifth, the patent examiner will reconsider
the application. SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 17-18. If the applicant has
complied with all of the examiner's requests or convinced the examiner to
change his or her position, the examiner will send a notice of allowance to the
applicant which indicates that a patent will issue as soon as the statutory fee is
received. SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 17-18. If the applicant has not complied
with all the examiner's requests, then multiple examiner's actions may result
until the examiner is satisfied. SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 18. Upon a final
rejection, an applicant can either "abandon the application, file an appeal with the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, take the allowed claims and cancel
the others, or file [another] application." SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 19.
22 For a brief discussion of the various statutory requirements that must be
met, see infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
23 35 U.S.C. § 101. Patentable subject matter includes "any . . .process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any ... improvement thereof
.... Id.
24 Id. § 102(a) (1994). See SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 52 ("A product or
process is not [novel] if all the elements of that product or process are present
in a single piece of relevant prior art .... If a single piece of relevant prior art
contains all the elements, it is said to anticipate the product or process.")
(footnotes omitted).
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"useful, '"25 "non-obvious"26 and cannot be barred.27
The patent application which is submitted by one or more
inventors "consists of a specification, one or more drawings (if
necessary), an oath or declaration, and the required filing fees."28
The specification, which includes a patent's claims, must contain
sufficient information regarding the "manner and process of making
and using [the invention], in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains
... to make and use the same ... "29 Moreover, the specification
25 35 U.S.C. § 101. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 51 ("For a product or
process to be useful it must, at the very least, work, although it does not have to
work perfectly or even better than any competing products or processes that
might exist.") (footnotes omitted).
26 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994) ("A patent may not be obtained ... if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains."). See SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 58-64 (explaining
the "nonobvious" requirement).
27 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), (d). A patent application may be barred, and thus
rejected by the PTO, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 102 under two separate subsections.
First, an application will be barred when
the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this
or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more
than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the
United States ....
Id. § 102(b). In addition, an application will be barred when
the invention was first patented or caused to be patented ... in a
foreign country prior to the date of the application for patent in this
country on an application for patent ... filed more than twelve months
before the filing of the application in the United States ....
Id. § 102(d).
28 SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 9. For an explanation of the various sections
of a patent application, see SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 9-13.
29 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994). See SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 11 (explaining
the enablement requirement).
[A] specification can have any format the drafter desires, although the
PTO prefers the following format:
1. title;
2. cross-reference to related applications;
3. statement regarding government rights;
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must present the "best mode contemplated by the inventor of
carrying out his [or her] invention."3 ° Because a patent's claims
define the scope of an inventor's rights and set out the subject
matter of an invention,3 an inventor has an incentive to draft the
broadest possible claims, whereas a patent examiner will try to
narrow the claims as much as possible.3 2 Nevertheless, a court's
construction is actually the ultimate arbiter of the scope of a patent.
Once a patent is issued, a patentee can bring an infringement
action against an alleged infringer when that person "without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention,
within the United States or imports into the United States any
patented invention during the term of the patent., 33 This action
4. background: (a) field of the invention, (b) description of related
art;
5. summary of the invention;
6. brief description of the drawings;
7. detailed description of the invention, including the best mode (or
description of the preferred embodiment);
8. claims;
9. abstract of the disclosure.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 10 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.77 (1993) and PATENT
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 601 (6th ed. 1995)).
30 35 U.S.C. § 112.
31 SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 11 ("The [patent's] claims set the metes and
bounds of the patent owner's exclusive rights."). See Whiteside, supra note 21,
at 1023-24 (explaining the role that claims play in a patent application).
32 Whiteside, supra note 21, at 1024 (commenting on the strategy of
inventors in drafting broad patent claims). See SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 12
("The claims of a patent may vary in scope. Broad claims include fewer
elements, or limitations, than narrow claims and therefore cover a wider range
of subject matter.").
Presumably, the reason why the PTO advocates the narrowing of a patent's
claims is to balance two competing interests. Namely, the government wants to
"promote the Progress of Science" by giving exclusive rights to inventors, which
serves as an enormous incentive, yet not stifle any further technical progress by
other inventors in having a patent with a broad scope. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8,
cl. 8.
13 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). For an extensive discussion of the necessary elements
of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) that must be proved in an infringement action, see
SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 75-87. See also Jason Scully, Note, Markman and
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can be based on literal infringement34 or on the doctrine of
equivalents. 35 For there to be literal infringement, an alleged
infringing device must contain every element within a patentee's
claim.36 However, for there to be infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents, the appropriate inquiry is whether "the accused
product or process contain[s] elements identical or equivalent to
each claimed element of the patented invention."37
Hilton Davis, The Federal Circuit Strikes an Awkward Balance: The Roles of the
Judge and Jury in Patent Infringement Suits, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
631, 634 (1996) (explaining the rights of a patentee against an alleged infringer).
14 See infra note 36 and accompanying text (explaining briefly the
requirements for proving literal infringement). The Supreme Court and Federal
Circuit in Markman dealt solely with literal infringement and offered no opinion
on a jury's role in litigation based on the doctrine of equivalents. See generally
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996) (discussing the
jury's reduced role in literal infringement issues); Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (same).
'5 See infra note 37 and accompanying text (defining the doctrine of
equivalents and noting the recent Supreme Court decision Warner-Jenkinson Co.
v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co.). See also Warner-Jenkinson, No. 95-728, 1997 WL
84999, at *3 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1997) (adhering to the doctrine of equivalents and
detailing the appropriate inquiry to determine infringement under the doctrine).
36 SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 81 ("[A] claim is literally infringed if each
properly construed claim reads on the accused product or process.") (footnote
omitted).
37 Warner-Jenkinson, 1997 WL 84999, at * 14. The U.S. Supreme Court has
recently decided the long-awaited Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem.
Co. case. See generally id. at *3. The Supreme Court's opinion, written by
Justice Thomas, began by stating that it rejected any invitation to "speak the
death" of the doctrine of equivalents. Id. However, even though the Court
adhered to the doctrine, it agreed with Judge Nies, who dissented from the
Federal Circuit's opinion in Hilton Davis, that the doctrine had "taken on a life
of its own, unbounded by the patent claims" which are statutorily required to
provide the scope of a patent. Id. at *8. To rectify what had become of the
doctrine, the Court defined the proper inquiry to determine infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents. Id. (agreeing with Judge Nies' dissent from the
Federal Circuit's opinion in Hilton Davis).
Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to
defining the scope of the patented invention, and thus the doctrine of
equivalents must be applied to individual elements of the claim, not the
invention as a whole.
732
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Patent infringement analysis reduces to two basic steps. 3' First,
the meaning of terms within a patent's claims must be interpreted
by a court as a matter of law.39 Interestingly, prior to Markman,
for centuries, many courts had treated claim construction as a
matter of law.40 Conversely, some courts decided that there were
Id (emphasis added). The Court, however, did not precisely characterize the
appropriate test for equivalence, but rather left it to the Federal Circuit's "sound
judgment in this area of its special expertise." Id. at * 14. The Court did provide
that
an analysis of the role played by each element in the context of the
specific patent claim will . .. inform the inquiry as to whether a
substitute element matches the function, way, and result of the claimed
element, or whether the substitute element plays a role substantially
different from the claimed element.
Id (emphasis added). Moreover, the Court stated that it was not necessary for it
to answer the question of whether it was for a judge or jury to decide equiva-
lence. Id. at * 13. Instead, the Court deferred to the Federal Circuit's decision in
Hilton Davis which declared that infringement under the doctrine must be
decided by a jury. Id. (noting that the jury's role was supported by prior
Supreme Court cases). To bolster its approval of the jury's role in deciding
infringement under the doctrine of equivalence, the Court looked to its recent
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. decision and statedthat "nothing in [that]
... decision necessitate[d] a different result than that reached by the Federal
Circuit." Id.
The above is meant solely as a fragmented overview of the Supreme Court's
decision in Hilton Davis. The doctrine of equivalents and the Hilton Davis
decision are beyond the scope of this Note and, thus, will not be addressed any
further.
3 Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1393 ("The two elements of a simple patent case,
construing the patent and determining whether infringement occurred, were
characterized by the former patent practitioner, Justice Curtis.") (footnote
omitted). See Scully, supra note 33, at 634 (noting that infringement actions
reduce to two basic steps).
" Scully, supra note 33, at 634.
40 See, e.g., Winansv. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 338 (1853) (stating
that the question of what is the device that is patented is a "question of law, to
be determined by the court, construing the letters-patent, and the description of
the invention and specification of claim annexed to them"); Silsby v. Foote, 55
U.S. (14 How.) 218, 225 (1852) ("The construction of the claim was undoubt-
edly for the court."). See also Amicus Brief for Matsushita Elec. Corp. at 13-14,
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996) (No. 95-26)
(emphasizing that the Supreme Court has for centuries made it clear that claim
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factual issues within a patent's claims, so that claim construction
was a matter for the jury." Thus, Markman clarified years of
disagreement about who might construe a patent's claims, the judge
or the jury. Second, a jury, only after being instructed by a judge
about the construction of the claims, will decide whether an
accused device infringes the patent.42 This role of the jury in
patent litigation is supported by centuries of case law and, more
importantly, is protected by the Seventh Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.43
In regard to the first step of claim construction, a Markman
Hearing has been utilized by trial judges as a means of construing
a patent's claims.4 4 This new procedural phase has revamped the
traditional structure of such litigation. In addition, if this hearing is
conducted pre-tria 45 and preceded by extensive discovery,46 then
construction is a matter of law for the court, not the jury).
41 See, e.g., Richard A. Machonkin, Note, Markman v. Westview Instru-
ments, Inc. and Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.: The
Federal Circuit Gets Its Laws and Facts Straight, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 181,
186 (1996) ("'If ... the meaning of a term of art in the claims is disputed and
extrinsic evidence is needed to explain the meaning, construction of the claims
could be left to the jury. In the latter instance, the jury cannot be directed to the
disputed meaning for the term of art."') (quoting McGill, Inc. v. John Zink Co.,
736 F.2d 666 (Fed Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984)).
42 Scully, supra note 33, at 634 (noting the second basic step in a patent
infringement suit).
43 Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1389 (establishing that patent infringement actions
are protected by the Seventh Amendment because cases dating back to the 18th
century tried such actions to a jury and today's infringement actions have their
origin in this case law). The Seventh Amendment provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
" See infra notes 89-97 and accompanying text (describing what a Markman
Hearing entails and advancing when during the litigation process a Markman
Hearing should and should not be held by a trial judge).
'5 See infra notes 90-94 and accompanying text (advocating the need to hold
Markman Hearings prior to trial in order to foster efficiency concerns).
46 For a discussion in favor of having comprehensive mandatory initial
disclosures prior to a Markman Hearing, see infra notes 114-16, 128-35 and
THE MARKMAN HEARING
a fully informed judge can not only interpret the scope of a patent,
but also provide an opportunity for litigants to efficiently tailor the
time-consuming trial and likely appellate process.47
II. SUPREME COURT OPINION
On April 23, 1996, the Supreme Court unanimously held that
the construction of patent claims, including terms of art within the
claims, is a matter of law reserved for the court and not subject to
the Seventh Amendment's right to a jury trial. 48 The Court briefly
explained the facts of the dispute.49
accompanying text.
" See infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text (stating the potential
inefficiency in holding Markman Hearings at the end of a trial, rather than before
or early in a trial).
48 Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1387.
" The following facts were extricated from the Federal Circuit's opinion,
because the Supreme Court gave only a cursory overview of them.
The Markman suit arose as a result of a patent owned by Herbert Markman,
namely an "Inventory Control and Reporting System for DryCleaning Stores."
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 971 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The
system was comprised of a keyboard, dataprocessor, dot matrix printer and at
least one optical scanner. Id. When the system was incorporated into a dry-
cleaning establishment, each transaction generated a printout that included a
segment of bar code which could be read by employees operating the optical
scanner(s). Id. at 971-72. As a result, a dry-cleaning store owner could keep track
of each article of clothing during every step of the process and therefore detect
the exact location of any additions or deletions. Id. at 972. "The overall result
is that additions to and deletions from inventory can be located-wherever an
optical detector appears-and can be associated with particular customers and
articles of clothing. In this way the inventory can be fully reconciled." Id.
Markman brought a patent infringement action against Westview Instru-
ments, Inc., the manufacturer of an allegedly infringing device, and Althon
Enterprises, an operator of dry-cleaning establishments using Westview' s devices.
Id. Westview's device consisted of two pieces of equipment, the "Datamark" and
the "Datascan."Id. at 972-73 (explaining in detail what comprised the Datamark
and Datascan and their respective functions). The "Datamark" stored in memory
the "invoice number, date, and cash total." Id. at 972. In addition, the printout,
which was a bar coded ticket, contained information regarding the "customer,
clothes to be cleaned, and the charges for the cleaning." Id. The "Datascan" reads
this bar code to determine whether there were "any discrepancies between the
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Justice Souter, who wrote for a unanimous Supreme Court,
began with an historical analysis of the Seventh Amendment's right
to a jury trial in a patent infringement action." He noted that
eighteenth-century infringement actions were tried at law by a
jury." Thus, he reasoned that because today's patent infringement
actions have their roots in these eighteenth-century actions, they too
must be tried by a jury. 2
After determining that a cause of action for patent infringement
is protected by the Seventh Amendment, the Supreme Court next
set out its analysis for the more troubling question of whether the
construction of patent claims themselves is a jury issue and,
therefore, afforded the same Seventh Amendment protection.
5 3
Again, Justice Souter turned to an historical approach, providing
that "[w]here there is no exact antecedent, the best hope lies in
comparing the modem practice to earlier ones whose allocation to
particular invoice read ... and the invoice list." Id. at 973. Westview contended
that its device did not infringe because it could not record and track articles of
clothing through the dry-cleaning process, but rather tracked invoices and
transaction totals. Id.
The dispute centered around the definition of the word "inventory" in
independent claim one and dependent claim ten of Markman's patent as used in
the phrases "maintain an inventory total" and "detect and localize spurious
additions to inventory." Id. After hearing testimony about the meaning of the
claim language, the jury found that Westview's device infringed Markman's
patent. Id. Nonetheless, the district court granted Westview's deferred motion for
judgment as a matter of law, stating that Westview's device was not capable of
tracking articles of clothing throughout the dry-cleaning process, while retaining
records on their status and location. Id.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower
court's holding that the interpretation of claim terms is the exclusive province of
the court and is consistent with the Seventh Amendment. See generally id. at
976-89 (explaining extensively the reasons why claim construction is a question
of law for the court). Subsequently, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed.
See generally Markman, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (reiterating, and expounding very little
upon, the Federal Circuit's reasons for construing claims as a matter of law).
'0 Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1389 (looking to 18th-century case law for
support).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
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court or jury we do know ... seeking the best analogy we can
draw between [the] ... old and the new."54
Justice Souter quickly disposed of any assertion that eighteenth-
century patent claims were interpreted by a jury, since the inclusion
of patent claims in a patent document did not become required until
the Patent Act of 1870." Rather, he noted that patent infringement
actions in the eighteenth century revolved around the construction
of a patent specification.56 Hence, after being unconvinced that
eighteenth-century cases construing patent specifications were even
tried by a jury, Justice Souter refused to analogize them to today's
patent claims." Furthermore, he noted that the nineteenth-century
cases first involving actual patent litigation practice before the
Supreme Court indicated that a judge, not a jury, construed a
patent. 5
8
Before the Supreme Court proceeded to further support its
holding that a judge is to construe the claims of a patent, it looked
at two nineteenth-century cases that Markman, the respondent,
advanced:5 9 Bischoff v Wethered60 and Tucker v Spalding.61
The respondent contended that Bischoff, as well as Tucker, whose
reasoning rested on Bischoff, held that the meaning of terms in a
patent document was a jury issue whenever expert testimony was
needed to assist in the construction.62 However, Justice Souter
14 Id. at 1390.
11 Id. See 9 ERNEST B. LIPSCOMB III, WALKER ON PATENTS 89 (3d ed.
1990) (printing in full the Consolidated Patent Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 198 (1870)).
56 Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1390.
17 Id. at 1391.
58 Id. at 1392 (citing several 19th-century cases as examples of a judge
construing a patent: Winans v. New York & Erie R.R. Co., 21 U.S. (1 How.) 88,
100 (1859); Winans v. Denmead, 15 U.S. (1 How.) 330, 338 (1854); Hogg v.
Emerson, 6 U.S. (1 How.) 437, 484 (1848)). In addition, the Supreme Court
cited to the English case Bovill v. Moore in which the judge construed the terms
in the patent specification, to reinforce that juries were not historically involved
in interpreting terms in a patent document. Id. (citing to Bovill v. Moore, Dav.
Pat. Cas. 361, 399, 404 (C.P. 1816)).
'9 Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1393-95.
60 9 U.S. (1 Wall.) 812 (1870).
61 13 U.S. (1 Wall.) 453 (1872).
62 Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1393.
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disagreed with such an interpretation and, in turn, stated that "[i]t
[was] a case in which the Court drew a line between issues of
document interpretation and product identification, and held that
expert testimony was properly presented to the jury on the latter,
ultimate issue, whether the physical objects produced by the patent
were identical. 63 Thus, the Supreme Court reasoned that the
introduction of extrinsic evidence to assist a jury in understanding
the character of an invention does not impinge upon the role of a
judge to construe a patent's claims as a matter of law.64
Upon finding no support in the history of patent litigation that
a jury should construe the claims of a patent, the Supreme Court
next turned to the interpretive skills of judges and juries.65 Justice
Souter noted that the "fact/law distinction at times has turned on a
determination that, as a matter of the sound administration of
justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide
the issue in question., 66 To support the conclusion that a judge is
better positioned, Justice Souter weighed heavily the assumption
that a judge, through his or her training and discipline, has
considerable experience in interpreting written instruments and, as
a result, there is less of a chance that a mistake in claim interpreta-
tion will be made.67 He was not persuaded by the respondent's
assertion that when a judge is determining the meaning of claim
terms through the help of expert testimony, a judge will be making
credibility determinations that are the proper role for a jury.68
Justice Souter rightfully admitted that credibility determinations
may be made during claim construction.69 Nevertheless, he
63 Id. at 1394.
64 Id. (referring to A. WALKER, PATENT LAWS § 75, at 68 (3d ed. 1895) and
2 W. ROBINSON, LAW OF PATENTS § 732, at 481-89 (1890) to further exemplify
the non-dispositive function of extrinsic evidence in determining whether claim
construction is for a judge or a jury).
65 Id. at 1395-96 (concluding that a judge is better suited to construe a
patent's claims, which may include determining the meaning of certain patent
terms because a jury is not familiar with the standard interpretation techniques
for such written instruments).
66 Id. at 1395.
67 id.
68 id.
69 Id,
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contended that a judge must still construe the claims as a matter of
law because "any credibility determinations will be subsumed
within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole document,
required by the standard construction rule that a term can be
defined only in a way that comports with the instrument as a
whole."7° Therefore, regardless of any "evidentiary underpin-
nings,"7 the Supreme Court declared that a judge is better trained
to evaluate an entire patent document to determine the meaning of
claim terms.
72
Lastly, Justice Souter looked to the policy of creating a uniform
patent process to justify allocating the obligation of construing the
claims to a judge.73 Emphasizing that the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit was established for the sole purpose of
creating this uniformity,74 Justice Souter enumerated several
70 Id. But see infra notes 143-53 and accompanying text (discussing the
inefficiency of having trial judges make, at times, pivotal credibility determina-
tions, only to have the Federal Circuit overlook such determinations during their
de novo review).
"' Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1396.
72 id.
The decisionmaker vested with the task of construing the patent is in
the better position to ascertain whether an expert's proposed definition
fully comports with the specification and claims and so will preserve
the patent's internal coherence. We accordingly think there is sufficient
reason to treat construction of terms of art like many other responsibil-
ities that we cede to a judge in the normal course of trial, notwith-
standing its evidentiary underpinnings.
Id. at 1395-96.
13 Id. ("[W]e see the importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given
patent as an independent reason to allocate all issues of construction to the
court."). The Supreme Court quotes from various sources to support the need for
uniformity. Id. (quoting United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S.
228, 236 (1942), General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364,
369 (1938), and Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573 (1877)).
74 Id. (noting that "increased uniformity would 'strengthen the United States
patent system in such a way as to foster technological growth and industrial
innovation"' (citing H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1981))).
[T]he uniformity in the law that will result from the centralization of
patent appeals in a single court will be a significant improvement from
the standpoint of the industries and businesses that rely on the patent
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reasons why the interpretation of claim terms should also be driven
by such a policy concern. 75 He proclaimed that the "' [1]imits of
a patent must be known for the protection of the patentee, the
encouragement of the inventive genius of others and the assurance
that the subject of the patent will be dedicated ultimately to the
public. '76
Despite the holding in Markman that judges must construe a
patent's claims, nowhere in Justice Souter's opinion,77 nor in the
concurring and dissenting opinions of the Federal Circuit in
Markman, was there any suggestions as to how.7 In particular,
there was no practical advice for district court judges to follow
regarding when, during a patent infringement litigation, claim
language could or should be interpreted.79
III. WHEN CAN A TRIAL JUDGE INTERPRET PATENT CLAIMS?
As a result of the Federal Circuit's silence in Markman, and the
lack of any guidance by the subsequent Supreme Court decision,
district courts have formulated three options available to a trial
judge for when claims can be interpreted."0 First, a judge can
system. Business planning becomes easier as more stable and predict-
able patent law is introduced.
Amicus Brief for Matsushita Elec. Corp. at 12, Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996) (No. 95-26) (quoting H.R. REP. No.
312, at 11).
15 Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1396.
76 Id. (citing General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364,
369 (1938)).
77 Some commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court in Markman
may have revealed an option that is available to trial judges for when claims can
be construed. See infra notes 107-12 and accompanying text (noting the possible
use of a jury's claim construction as an advisory determination for a court's
ultimate post-trial interpretation).
7 See supra note 5 (pointing out the lack of procedural guidance by both the
Supreme Court and, more surprisingly, the Federal Circuit which commonly
hears appeals based on patent infringement issues).
" See supra note 5 (indicating the lack of practical advice by the Federal
Circuit and the Supreme Court in Markman).
80 See Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 894 F. Supp.
844, 850 (D. Del. 1995). The court set forth what it believed to be the three
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construe a patent's claims on the paper record."' Second, a judge
can hold a separate bench trial, which has come to be known as a
Markman Hearing.8 2 Third, a judge can wait until all the evidence
has been presented at a trial, and prior to instructing a jury, before
taking a hiatus to construe a patent's claims.83
The first option of construing a patent's claims solely on the
paper record will only be of use to a trial judge when there is no
options that are available to a trial judge regarding when claims can be
construed, due to the "'obligation' created by the Federal Circuit to instruct the
jury on the meaning of the words used by the inventor in a claim . . . ." Id. It
is quite ironic that the district courts themselves have established the framework
for when claims can be construed, rather than the Federal Circuit which was
created by Congress to make the patent litigation process more uniform. ROBERT
L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 16.1(b), at 617, 621 (3d ed.
1994) (noting that the Federal Circuit was established to "bring about uniformity
in the area of patent law" and, thus, make the outcome of patent litigation more
predictable).
8 ElfAtochem, 894 F. Supp. at 850. See infra notes 84-88 and accompany-
ing text (describing briefly the first option and when it will be available to trial
judges). An instance when a judge could construe a patent's claims just on the
paper record is upon either litigant making a summary judgment motion prior to
a Markman Hearing. See, e.g., Moll v. Northern Telecom, Inc., No. CIV.A.94-
5451, 1995 WL 733389, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 1995) (granting a partial
summary judgment motion on the construction of six of the patent's claims
before a pre-trial Markman Hearing was held). However, a judge will likely deny
such a pre-trial motion and hold a Markman Hearing in which expert testimony
can be heard. See, e.g., id at *3, 10-11 (denying a partial summary judgment
motion on the construction of two of the patent's claims until a Markman
Hearing was held and a "more developed record" was established to assist the
judge in the interpretation). See also infra note 171 (noting that most courts will
hold a Markman Hearing to construe a patent's claims, rather than attempt to
construe the claims just on the paper record).
82 Elf Atochem, 894 F. Supp. at 850. See infra notes 89-97 and accompany-
ing text (describing the Markman Hearing as a recently developed procedural
step held by numerous trial judges as a method for interpreting a patent's
claims). For the various districts which have implemented a pre-trial Markman
Hearing, see supra note 8.
83 Elf Atochem, 894 F. Supp. at 850. See infra notes 98-106 and accompa-
nying text (describing the option available to judges of waiting until the end of
a trial to construe a patent's claims and pointing out the inefficiency in such an
option). For cases in which a judge had waited until the end of a trial to construe
a patent's claims, see infra note 98.
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ambiguity about the claim's proper interpretation. 4 When such an
instance arises, a judge can perform the claim construction without
the aid of expert testimony at a pre-trial Markman Hearing. 5
However, due to the technical complexity of the subject matter in
most patent infringement suits8 6 and the fact that the paper record
alone may not be clearly explanatory, a judge will likely want to
hear expert testimony before construing the claims.87 Thus, this
first option will not be of much practical use to a trial judge,
particularly in light of the other available options.88
84 Northern Telecom, 1995 WL 733389, at *8 (stating that the claim's terms
were defined by their common dictionary meaning and thus the movant was
entitled to summary judgment on the claim construction because there was no
infringement of those terms).
85 In Moll v. Northern Telecom, Inc., the court was confronted with a partial
summary judgment motion regarding the construction of eight claims. Id. at *3.
Before a pre-trial Markman Hearing was held, the court granted the motion for
six of the patent's claims after examining evidence submitted by the parties. Id.
This paper record included the patent's claims and specification, "exhibits from
the prosecution history, declarations of technical expert witnesses, deposition
transcripts, and answers to various interrogatories and discovery request." Id.
Because the judge was able to clearly construe these claims from the paper
record alone, there was no need to wait until the pre-trial Markman Hearing was
held. Id.
86 SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 130 (noting that the technical nature of even
a rudimentary patent case requires answers to "very complex intellectual
questions").
In patent cases involving complex technology ... jurors [as well as
judges] may be confronted with remarkably complex evidence
concerning inventions produced by the best minds in biogenetics,
physics, computer technology, and so on.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 17, at 130 (footnote omitted).
87 Northern Telecom, 1995 WL 733389, at * 10-11 (deciding not to construe
two of the patent's claims from just the paper record because a "more developed
record [was] required"). The Northern Telecom court stated that to perform the
claim construction task properly it needed to hear "expert testimony and a
dissection of the [patent] specification at a Markman bench trial." Id. at *10.
88 See generally infra notes 89-112 (discussing the other available options
for when a patent's claims can be construed, such as holding a Markman Hearing
or waiting until the end of a trial). A judge should be looking to promote
fairness among the litigants and therefore be hesitant in construing a patent's
claims on the paper record because his or her construction can play a dispositive
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The desire for additional evidence has caused most trial judges
to choose the second option, the so-called Markman Hearing. 9
This hearing can be conducted either before or during an actual
trial.9" To effectuate the inherent benefits of this claim construc-
tion hearing, it should be conducted prior to a trial.91 This benefit
has been enunciated by numerous judges and commentators as
being the potentially dispositive nature of claim construction.92
With this in mind, the parties can determine, after the conclusion
of the hearing, what procedural path they should take.93
role in the ensuing litigation. See supra note 4 (noting the potentially dispositive
nature of a claim construction).
'9 See supra note 8 (illustrating some of the courts that have held such claim
construction hearings). See also John B. Pegram, Markman and Its Implications,
78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 560, 566 (1996) ("It is likely that most
courts will hold a 'Markman Hearing' before the trial to receive argument by the
attorneys and possibly expert testimony, likely to be in the form of opinion.").
" Once a judge decides that he or she will hold a Markman Hearing, the
next issue facing the judge is specifically when during the litigation the hearing
should be conducted. Pegram, supra note 89, at 566 (debating whether a
Markman Hearing should occur before trial or in the early stages of trial); Joseph
R. Re & Joseph F. Jennings, Answers and Questions Raised by the Federal
Circuits Markman and Hilton Davis Decisions, in WINNING STRATEGIES IN
PATENT LITIGATION 1995, at 877, 909-10 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks,
& Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 423, 1995) (questioning the
appropriate time for a Markman Hearing). The hearing could be conducted at the
"summary judgment stage, at a pre-trial conference, or as a motion in limine."
Re & Jennings, supra, at 910.
9' Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, Ltd., 911 F. Supp. 76, 79
(E.D.N.Y. 1996). The district court in Loral stated that the "meaning of claim
terms is the central issue in patent litigation [and. .. w]ith most aspects of trial
hinging on this determination ... a conscientious court will generally endeavor
to make this ruling before trial." Id. (emphasis added). This significant statement
that claim construction should occur before trial was written by Judge Randall
R. Rader of the Federal Circuit. Id. at 76.
92 See supra note 4 (exemplifying the opinion that claim construction often
determines which party will be victorious at trial); supra note 91 (quoting Judge
Randall R. Rader of the Federal Circuit as stating that claim construction is a
central issue in patent infringement litigation and, thus, may determine which
party will triumph).
"' There are several procedural options available to the parties after a
Markman Hearing has concluded. The alleged infringer may make a summary
judgment motion to dispose of the entire case, claiming that there is "no genuine
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Furthermore, a court, by holding a pre-trial hearing, would be
creating an opportunity to preserve the limited judicial resources
that are inevitably utilized during a lengthy, and sometimes
circuitous, trial.94
During a Markman Hearing, the parties may, in the court's
discretion, submit various forms of extrinsic evidence, such as
technical dictionaries, textbooks, deposition statements by witnesses
and affidavits by expert witnesses, to support their proposed claim
constructions.95 In addition, a judge will most likely elect to hear
testimony from expert witnesses regarding the meaning of the terms
issue as to any material fact." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (1994). See infra notes 154-
71 and accompanying text (discussing summary judgment motions and what is
required for courts to grant them). In addition, either party may motion for an
interlocutory appeal as to the trial judge's claim construction. See generally 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994) (setting forth the requirements for granting an
interlocutory appeal). Even though these appeals have been rarely granted
historically, courts hopefully will grant an increased number of such appeals as
a result of the Markman case, noting the persuasive efficiency argument of not
having trials carried on via an improper claim construction. See infra notes 172-
74 and accompanying text (reasoning that courts should grant more interlocutory
appeals). Also, the parties may decide to engage in settlement proceedings as a
result of being made fully aware of which party the claim construction
potentially favors and, thus, which party will likely be victorious following ajury
verdict. See infra note 171 and accompanying text (noting briefly the settlement
option that is available to the parties). Finally, if the parties are unsuccessful with
any of the above procedural paths, they will have to resort to the continuance of
the trial. See, e.g., Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 87 F.3d 1559, 1563 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (noting that the trial judge deferred granting the judgment as a matter
of law motion until after the jury's verdict), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 1240 (1997).
14 Upon holding a pre-trial claim construction hearing, a court might have
the occasion to grant a summary judgment motion on the entire case or the
litigants may reach a settlement. See infra notes 154-71 (discussing summary
judgment motions and partial summary judgment motions in patent infringement
litigation); infra note 171 (noting the settlement option which litigants may
decide to elect once a patent's claims are construed). If either of these occur, the
trial process will be short-circuited and, thus, judicial resources will be spared.
9' Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 894 F. Supp. 844,
848 (D. Del. 1995) (providing examples of the extrinsic evidence that parties
may submit). See infra notes 141-47 and accompanying text (describing what
extrinsic evidence is, the role it plays in patent infringement litigation and the
appropriate instances when a judge can rely on such evidence).
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in the claims because the primary purpose in holding a Markman
Hearing is to give a judge an opportunity to have expert witnesses
testify.9 6 After the hearing and upon the evaluation of all the
evidence brought forth by both parties, a trial judge can then better
construe a patent's claims. Once the claims are construed in a
Markman Hearing, the parties may have the occasion to appeal the
claim construction to the Federal Circuit.
97
The third option available to a judge is to construe a patent's
claims at the end of a trial, before instructing the jury.98 Presum-
ably, a Markman Hearing will not be needed at this point in a trial
because a judge will have already heard all the relevant evidence.
However, there are disadvantages in waiting. 99 One such detriment
96 See Loral Fairchild, 911 F. Supp. at 79 (noting that a district court
presented with "conflicting views of technical terms may prudently enlist the aid
of qualified experts to determine the meaning of the claim terms"). See also infra
notes 143-53 and accompanying text (referring to the use of expert testimony by
judges to assist in the interpretation of a patent's claims and the practical
problem associated with such use, namely credibility determinations).
' For a discussion of the various ways in which a claim construction may
be appealed early in a litigation, such as the granting of a summary judgment
motion or interlocutory appeal, and the corresponding benefits, see infra notes
102-06, 154-74 and accompanying text.
98 See, e.g., Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1573,
1575 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d
1553, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2554 (1996); Johns Hopkins
Univ. v. Celpro, 894 F. Supp. 819, 826 (D. Del. 1995). The third option
available to a trial judge has been advocated by practitioners because it allows
a court to hear a more complete and thorough array of evidence throughout the
progression of an entire trial. Interview with Errol B. Taylor, Partner, Fitzpatrick,
Celia, Harper & Scinto, in New York, N.Y. (Aug. 19, 1996). But see Pegram,
supra note 89, at 566 (stating that because the Federal Circuit in Markman
"limited the materials which the judge is required to consider in construing the
claims," the argument is unpersuasive that a judge should wait until the end of
trial after all evidence has been presented).
99 Judge Schwartz of the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware has
stated that "[t]wenty years of trial experience convinces ... [him] that any jury
hiatus should be avoided if at all possible." Lucas Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unison
Indus., L.P., 890 F. Supp. 329, 332 n.3 (D. Del. 1995). For further negative
commentary on waiting until the end of trial to construe a patent's claims, see
Elf Atochem, 894 F. Supp. at 857 (stating that as a jury waits, there are "serious
practical problems of how to adequately and fairly rule on [the]. . . difficult and
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is having a jury simply wait while a judge examines the volumi-
nous trial transcript and additional briefs filed by the parties which
can take a number of days.'00 This hiatus creates the possibility
that the jury will forget vital and pivotal evidence in the often
complicated litigation.l10
Furthermore, to foster efficiency throughout the litigation
process, a judge should not wait until the end of a trial to construe
a patent's claims.1"2 When claim construction occurs before trial
or in the early stages of trial, a judge's construction is in a prime
position to be appealed to the Federal Circuit for de novo
review.' 3 This can be accomplished, for example, through the
vitally important issue[]" of claim construction after all evidence has been
presented); Robert C. Scheinfeld, 'Markman' Issues Ready for Supreme Court
Review, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 15, 1995, at 3 (commenting on the impracticality of
having a jury wait while a judge construes the claims before deliberating on the
issue of infringement). But see ElfAtochem, 894 F. Supp. at 857 (stating that in
a bench trial there are no practical problems when a judge waits until the end to
construe the claims after all evidence has been presented) (emphasis added).
,0o Lucas Aerospace, 890 F. Supp. at 332 n.3 (noting the time-consuming
process of construing a patent's claims during a trial as a jury waits, but stating
that a judge should not rush the claim interpretation because it is "[un]fair to the
litigants when claim construction more often than not determines the outcome on
infringement").
'0' Id. (discussing the "practical problem [s]" associatedwith a judge's claim
construction at the end of a trial, in particular the risk that a jury will forget
important facts during such a hiatus).
102 Scheinfeld, supra note 99, at 3 (noting that efficiency dictates against
construing claims at the end of trial).
'03 Pegram, supra note 89, at 567 (emphasizing that efficiency concerns
dictate holding a Markman Hearing before trial so that a case will be in a
position to be appealed to the Federal Circuit which conducts a de novo review).
A case can be appealed in one of four ways before the actual trial is completed,
but not necessarily after a Markman Hearing has concluded. Pegram, supra note
89, at 567-70. First, a court can grant a summary judgment motion. Pegram,
supra note 89, at 567-68. See infra notes 154-71 and accompanying text
(discussing the summary judgment motion). Second, a court can submit a request
for an interlocutory appeal, which the Federal Circuit has the discretion to accept.
Pegram, supra note 89, at 568. See infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text
(discussing the interlocutory appeal). Third, once a court either grants or rejects
an injunction, the parties have a right to an immediate appeal. Pegram, supra
note 89, at 568-69. Finally, "when there is more than one claim for relief or
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granting of an interlocutory appeal 114 or a summary judgment
motion.' '5 By the Federal Circuit reviewing claim construction
early in a litigation, a jury will not have wasted weeks sitting on a
trial that was the product of an erroneous judicial construction. 10 6
According to the Federal Circuit's majority opinion in
Markman, which stated that claim interpretation "may also be done
in the context of dispositive motions such as those seeking
judgment as a matter of law,"107 commentators have noted that
there seems to be a fourth option available to a judge for when a
patent's claims can be construed.'0 8 This option permits a judge
to submit the question of claim construction to a jury in the form
of special interrogatories, but limits the jury's answers to an
multiple parties in a case, the district court may enter a separate final judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) with respect to one or more claims
for relief, or one or more parties." Pegram, supra note 89, at 569-70; FED. R.
Civ. P. 54(b) (1994).
104 See 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (providing that the granting of this appeal involves
the discretion of both the district court and the Federal Circuit). See also Elf
Atochen, 894 F. Supp. at 857 (depending on whether factual disputes exist about
the accused product, interlocutory appeals or a final order may be appropriate to
bring the claim construction issue promptly before the Federal Circuit); infra
notes 172-74 and accompanying text (advocating the need for courts to grant
more interlocutory appeals). But see Pegram, supra note 89, at 568 (listing
reasons why interlocutory appeals are not commonly granted).
'05 See FED. R. Civ. P. 56. See also Pegram, supra note 89, at 567-68
(providing time when summary judgment motions may be granted and appealed);
infra notes 154-71 and accompanyingtext (discussing broadly summaryjudgment
motion practice in patent infringement litigation and the efficiency concerns
which are furthered when such motions are granted early in a litigation).
16 Elf Atochem, 894 F. Supp. at 857.
[I]n jury cases, it may be more efficient to put the case in a posture to
have the Federal Circuit review the claim interpretation issue before
trying the case to a jury, in order to avoid wasting two weeks or more
of a citizen's time because the court erroneously instructed the jury on
the meaning of a claim term.
Id.
107 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 981 (Fed. Cir.
1995), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
lo' Hoffman & Wasleff, supra note 3, at 19-20 (commenting on the
additional option that may be available to a trial judge).
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"advisory determination""1 9 when construing the claims as a
matter of law on a post-trial motion."' If this proves to be a
viable option available to a trial judge, the crux lies in a judge's
use of special interrogatories."' Specifically, by implementing
special interrogatories, the Federal Circuit on appeal can determine
the exact claim construction used by a jury in determining whether
infringement occurred. Thus, the Federal Circuit can reinstate the
109 Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 62 F.3d 1388, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
0 Id. The court in Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp. did not construe the
patent's claims before or during trial, rather the court gave the issue of claim
construction to the jury in the form of special interrogatories. Id However, the
court did recognize that "claim construction is a legal issue within the sole
province of the court" and thus merely treated the jury's construction as an
"advisory determination." Id. See Motorola, Inc. v. Interdigital Tech. Corp., 930
F. Supp. 952, 962 (D. Del. 1996) (noting that even though the "more efficient
course" may be to inform a jury of the proper claim construction, a court may
still construe a patent's claims after a jury verdict on a post-trial judgment as a
matter of law motion) (quoting Fonar Corp. v. General Elec. Corp., 902 F. Supp.
330, 337 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 107 F.3d 1543 (Fed.
Cir. 1997)); Hoffman & Wasleff, supra note 3, at 19 & n. 19 (noting the Laitram
court's use of the jury as an advisory panel).
' Amicus Brief for Matsushita Elec. Corp. at 17-21, Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996) (No. 95-26) (arguing that if ajury must
construe patent claims, then special interrogatories should be used so that the
jury's construction can be reviewed). In contrast, general interrogatories will not
have the same effect for the obvious reason that the appellate court will be
unable to ascertain the jury's claim construction, and a new trial will be
inevitable. Id. at 21-22 (explaining the "perils of general verdicts").
Special interrogatories are those used for a special verdict and are defined
as:
written questions susceptible of categorical or other brief answer or...
written forms of the several special findings which might properly be
made under the pleadings and evidence; or ... such other method of
submitting the issues and requiring the written findings thereon ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a) (1994).
In contrast, general interrogatories are those used for a general verdict are
defined as:
written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of
which is necessary to a verdict... . [T]he court ... direct[s] the jury
both to make written answers and to render a general verdict.
FED. R. Civ. P. 49(b).
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jury's verdict to avoid the time-consuming procedure of reconstru-
ing the claims, assuming the jury's claim construction was
correct. 112
In sum, by holding a pre-trial Markman Hearing, rather than
utilizing one of the other options, a court can attempt to properly
construe the claims as a matter of law with all the necessary
extrinsic evidence, and yet appreciate the possibility that it engaged
in an incorrect claim construction. At the conclusion of the hearing,
the door will have been left open for the chance at an early
appellate review."'
IV THE EXTENT OF DISCOVERY PRIOR TO A MARKMAN
HEARING
In light of Markman, discovery prior to and during a Markman
Hearing is vital to a litigation due to the plausibly dispositive
nature of the claim construction.114 Therefore, a trial judge should
see to it that the parties begin a Markman Hearing fully aware of
all relevant information.'15 A judge's duty to determine the
112 See, e.g., Laitram, 62 F.3d at 1394-95 (reversing and remanding with
instructions to reinstate the jury verdict).
"' See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 154-
74 and accompanying text (exploring the different ways in which a litigant can
obtain an early appellate review and recommending the need for holding such
reviews immediately following a claim construction hearing).
14 See supra note 4 (illustrating the various sources that note a claim
construction's potentially dispositive role in a litigation). See also Hoffman &
Wasleff, supra note 3, at 20 (stating that discovery should not be entered into
before the claim construction hearing because the litigation could be avoided
through the granting of an early partial summary judgment motion).
"5 If a Markman Hearing is conducted too early in a litigation, discovery
issues may arise. For example, parties may not have ample time to complete their
discovery before the hearing and thus lack all the necessary material to attack the
opposing party's claim construction theory. See Viskase Corp. v. American Nat'l
Can Co., No. 93-C-7651, 1996 WL 377054, at *3 (N.D. I11. July 1, 1996) (noting
the importance of having all parties fully prepared for the pre-trial Markman
Hearing because such a hearing can significantly shorten the subsequent jury
trial). Moreover, the parties may be uncooperative with each other. See, e.g.,
Laser Indus., Ltd. v. Reliant Tech., Inc., 167 F.R.D. 417, 419 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(noting a party's resistance in disclosing certain documents by claiming that the
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meaning of claim terms will greatly be eased if all the relevant
evidence has already been produced, leaving only expert testimony
to be heard at the judge's discretion. Such a result is achieved by
making the discovery process more efficient, less costly and less
time-consuming. 116
information was privileged). See also Viskase, 1996 WL 377054, at *2 (stating
that if an adverse party is uncooperative in discovery, timely extensions should
be sought for the discovery period).
To promote efficiency at the discovery stage, a trial judge should take an
active role in the discovery process, which is feasible due to the unique nature
of a claim construction hearing. See infra Part IV.B (mandating that the parties
disclose specific material before the claim construction hearing, while a judge
indirectly oversees the entire process). However, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ("Federal Rules") require that a trial judge take a hands-off approach.
See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (1994) (providing rules for discovery that are
essentially party-controlled and party-initiated). On occasion, the Federal Rules
do allow a judge to intervene in the discovery process when disputes arise. For
example, a judge may grant motions to compel discovery or issue protective
orders. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (protective orders); FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (1994)
(motion to compel discovery).
It should be noted that the discovery process has several goals: (1) to
identify the issues for trial, (2) to eliminate surprise, (3) to preserve evidence that
may not be available at the trial, (4) to discourage "lazy" lawyers, and (5) to
promote settlement. Telephone Interview with Jennifer L. Rosato, Professor,
Brooklyn Law School (Oct. 10, 1996). See Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co.
of Japan, Ltd., 911 F. Supp. 76, 79 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that the Federal
Rules were drafted to "eliminate surprise").
116 Responding to such policy concerns, the Federal Rules were amended in
1993 to require mandatory initial disclosures. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a); infra
notes 117-27 and accompanying text (discussing the adoption of the mandatory
initial disclosure requirement to the Federal Rules and the lack of a similar
requirement in any state's local patent rules).
A major purpose of the revision [was] to accelerate the exchange of
basic information about the case and to eliminate the paper work
involved in requesting such information, and the rule should be applied
in a manner to achieve these objectives. . . . [T]he experience of the
few state and federal courts that have required pre-discovery exchange
of core information such as is contemplated in Rule 26(a)(1) indicates
that savings in time and expense can be achieved .... [T]he present
revision puts in place a series of disclosure obligations that ... are
designed to eliminate certain discovery, help focus the discovery that
is needed, and facilitate preparation for trial or settlement.
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A. Discovery Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Federal
Rules") allows for a broad scope of discovery." 7 The parties
"may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which
is relevant to the subject matter involved .... Such discover-
able material may be acquired, for example, through the use of
interrogatories" 9 or depositions 2 ° during a patent infringement
litigation. However, the discovery process may be a prolonged and
arduous task.
To make the discovery stage more efficient, the Federal Rules
mandate that certain material be automatically given to the
opposing party at the beginning of a litigation.12' Despite this
H.R. Doc. No. 103-74, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 225-27 (1993).
In addition, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
is currently undergoing the process of promulgating local patent rules that deal
exclusively with discovery prior to a Markman Hearing. See Proposed Local
Rules of Practice in Patent Cases: United States District Court for the Northern
District of California (visited Feb. 3, 1997) <http://www.callaw.com/-
patrules.html>; infra app. (providing the Northern District of California's most
current draft of the Local Rules of Practice in Patent Cases which entails an
extensive amount of mandatory initial disclosures before a mandatory claim
construction hearing). For a discussion of the policy reasons for having
mandatory initial disclosures prior to a Markman Hearing, see infra notes 128-35
and accompanying text.
..7 Advisory Committee's Notes, FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (1983 amendments)
(commenting on the "broad, permissive terms of the rules").
118 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
"9 See FED. R. CIv. P. 33 (1994) (setting forth the requirements for serving
interrogatories upon parties).
20 See FED. R. Civ. P. 30 (1994) (setting forth the requirements for oral
depositions); FED. R. Civ. P. 31 (1994) (setting forth the requirements for
written depositions).
121 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) (mandating that the parties, without awaiting a
discovery request, provide to each other certain initial disclosures). For the
underlying policy reasons of Rule 26(a)(1), see supra note 116.
Even though Rule 26(a)(1) provides for certain mandatory disclosures, not
all the district courts have implemented the requirement since its addition in
1993. DONNA STIENSTRA, RESEARCH DIVISION, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURE IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, WITH
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requirement, these mandatory initial disclosures are not well suited
for the discovery period proceeding a Markman Hearing or, more
generally, the unique nature of a patent infringement action. A
patent infringement action involves specific relevant information,
such as any "prior art"' a party may be aware of and a party's
"claim charts.' 23 Materials such as these are not included in the
general mandatory initial disclosures under the Federal Rules.
124
The parties must, therefore, make discovery requests accordingly.
SPECIFIC ATTENTION TO COURTS' RESPONSES TO SELECTED AMENDMENTS TO
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26, at 4-5, 8-27 (Mar. 23, 1996) (reporting
the response of all 94 federal districts to the Federal Rule 26 amendments). Out
of the 94 districts, 47 have put Federal Rule 26(a)(1) into effect. Id. at 4-5
(noting that six of these 47 districts made a significant change to the rule). Out
of the remaining 47 districts that have not put Federal Rule 26(a)(1) into effect,
"three require initial disclosure through local rules, orders, or the [Civil Justice
Reform Act] plan, one requires disclosure in a specified set of case types, and
seventeen . . . specifically give individual judges authority to require initial
disclosure." Id. at 4, 8-27 (tabulating the actions of each district). "[Thus, i]n
only twenty-six courts ... are all cases routinely exempt from any rules-federal
or local-requiring initial disclosure." Id. at 4.
122 "Prior art" is defined as "any relevant knowledge, acts, descriptions and
patents which pertain to, but predate, [the] invention in question. . . . Prior art
may ... be relied on by a court to hold a patent claim invalid, i.e., not novel or
not unobvious." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1193 (6th ed. 1990) (citations
omitted). See HARMON, supra note 80, § 3.2-.4 (explaining in detail what
constitutes prior art and how a patent can be declared invalid, or a patent
application denied, due to prior art).
123 "Claim charts" are created by a patentee to show how the accused
infringing device "reads on" each of the patent's claims. See, e.g., Nike Inc. v.
Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 43 F.3d 644, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting the
adverse party's request that the patentee produce claim charts that detail how the
patent's claims allegedly read on their product). See also infra app. § 2-2(a)
(describing a claimant's obligation under the Northern District of California's
proposed local patent rules to create claim charts that must be disclosed to an
adverse party within a specified time period). In addition, opposing claim charts
may be created by an alleged infringer to "identify all items of prior art that
anticipate [a] claim or render it obvious," thus attempting to render the patent
invalid. Infra app. § 2-2(b).
124 See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (mandating the initial disclosure of
specific materials, none of which expressly captures knowledge of prior art or the
production of claim charts).
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Due to the general nature of Federal Rule 26(a), the Federal
Rules permit courts to follow local discovery rules that deal with
certain areas of the law more specifically.'25 In the area of patent
law, however, there are no local patent rules currently in effect
which address mandatory initial disclosures. 126 Thus, discovery
before an early Markman Hearing may be inefficient, due to the
lack of structure and administrative guidance.
127
B. Mandatory Discovery in the Northern District of
California
Realizing that Markman has created procedural inefficiency at
the pre-trial stage, the advisory committee from the Northern
District of California has drafted local patent rules to supplement
25 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) ("Except to the extent otherwise stipulated or
directed by ... local rule," Federal Rule 26 is applicable). "The enumeration in
Rule 26(a) of items to be disclosed does not prevent a court from requiring by
order or local rule that the parties disclose additional information without a
discovery request." H.R. Doc. No. 103-74, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 225 (1993).
See STIENSTRA, supra note 121, at 1 (stating that Federal Rule 26 gives a federal
court flexibility in exempting all or some cases from the mandatory initial
disclosure requirements).
126 The Northern District of California's local patent rules are not yet in
effect. See infra note 128 (noting the current status of the local patent rules and
the expected adoption date). For a critique of the policy virtues of these
mandatory initial disclosure rules, see infra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
See also infra app. (providing the most recent draft of the rules).
127 The parties will likely have to grapple with each other and the court to
have the opposing party produce the needed relevant material necessary to be
fully prepared for a claim construction hearing. See 1 ETHAN HORWITZ &
LESTER HORWITZ, PATENT LITIGATION: PROCEDURE & TACTICS § 5.01(2) (1996)
(observing that the discovery process in patent litigation is usually a "source of
bitterness and acrimony"). The court in Lee Pharmaceuticals v. Den-Mat, Inc.
stated that the discovery process was "aggressive, abusive, and harassing." 197
U.S.P.Q. 62, 62 (C.D. Cal. 1976). See HORWITZ & HORWITZ, supra ("'There is
rarely a spirit of co-operation [during discovery]. Nothing is done voluntarily;
everything requires an order of the court . . . ."') (citing Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 36 F.R.D. 1, 3-4 (N.D. Ohio 1964)). Efficiency
concerns in preserving judicial resources dictate otherwise.
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the Federal Rules. 2 These local rules are the first of their kind
to require mandatory initial disclosures prior to a mandatory claim
construction hearing. 2 9 The committee's purpose was to establish
a "uniform set of pre-trial procedures"' 30 and "to reduce the
occasion for Standing Orders by individual judges." ''
2 See infra app. (functioning pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994) and FED.
R. Civ. P. 83 (1994)). See also Lynn H. Pasahow, Discovery Downsizing Under
the Influence of the Rule Changes and Rocket Dockets, in PATENT LITIGATION
1996, at 151, 153, 169-71, 174-89 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, &
Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 456, 1996) (noting that if the
local patent rules proposed in the Northern District of California are adopted,
they will require "significant change[s] in current practice"). The advisory
committee has submitted a draft of these local patent rules to the district court
which is expected to officially adopt them in mid 1997. Telephone Interview
with Ian Keye, Operations Manager, Northern District of California (Apr. 7,
1997). The public comment period ended February 14, 1997, and subsequently
the comments were sent to Judge Ronald M. White, who oversees a committee
that will evaluate them. Telephone Interview with Ian Keye, Operations Manager,
Northern District of California (Feb. 11, 1997). See JEANNE J. BOWDEN,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO REVISION OF LOCAL
COURT RULES 1, 12 (1988) (commenting on the Federal Rule 83 requirement
that a district court give the public notice of any proposed local rules and allow
for public comment). However, the chair of the advisory committee expects very
little change because the rules have already received excellent reviews from the
patent field in California. Telephone Interview with Daniel Johnson, Chair of the
Advisory Committee, Northern District of California (Oct. 10, 1996).
There are several reasons that may cause a court to amend its local rules.
BOWDEN, supra, at 1-2. Some of these reasons include "changes in federal law
and in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," "increases in the number of case
filings," "additions of judgeships" and "significant changes in the types of cases
or complexity of cases filed in the court." BOWDEN, supra, at 1.
29 See generally infra app. (requiring an extensive amount of material to be
disclosed among all parties before the commencement of a claim construction
hearing).
130 Infra app. § 1-2(a).
131 Infra app. § 1-2(a). "Standing orders" are defined as "[r]ules adopted by
particular courts for governing practice before them. In some states [, presumably
California,] the presiding judge has authority to adopt standing orders for his
court alone." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 122, at 1405. See BOWDEN,
supra note 128, at 9 (noting that the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia's primary purpose for revising its local rules was to "review... [the]
judges' individual civil pretrial practices and . . . [to adopt] uniform pretrial
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Under the district court's local rules, both parties have numer-
ous mandatory initial disclosures.132 Consequently, these rules
establish a more productive discovery process, including a rigid
time frame to produce the material,'33 to precede a compulsory
Markman Hearing.'34 The result of such local rules will be to
documents for the court").
'32 See generally infra app. (providing the disclosure requirements for the
claimant and the adverse party, along with the rigid time frame to produce such
disclosures before the parties must meet with the court and mutually agree on a
date to hold a mandatory pre-trial Markman Hearing).
33 In a different context, yet apparently inspired by similar policy concerns,
courts, which follow the Civil Justice Reform Act, have established a "relatively
rigid time frame" which provides that cases will be tried within one year from
filing the complaint and will not exceed two weeks. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc.
v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 894 F. Supp. 844, 857 (D. Del. 1995). The court in
Elf Atochem specifically noted:
[E]xperience with this relatively rigid time frame shows that it
promotes more efficient resolution of civil matters. For example, faced
with firm and certain trial dates parties are often encouraged to settle
rather than proceed with trial. Furthermore ... this time frame assures
parties that by a date certain they will have a final resolution of issues
facing and affecting them as a result of litigation.
Id. These underlying policies can very well be extended to and support the
reasoning behind a rigid time frame in the discovery process preceding a
mandatory claim construction hearing. See generally infra app. (setting forth an
efficient discovery process by requiring the claimant and adverse party to make
disclosures within specific time frames).
"' An argument may be made that a litigant who does not have the financial
resources to hire a team of attorneys to work on his or her case will be unable
to satisfy such discovery requirements. Accordingly, such a litigant can attempt
to invoke a discovery limitation under the Federal Rules.
The .. .extent of use of the discovery methods otherwise permitted
... by any local rule shall be limited by the court if it determines that
... the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its
likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in
controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake
in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in
resolving the issues.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2). In addition, the Northern District of California's local
patent rules state that a trial judge can modify the time limits for any of the
mandatory initial disclosures and require the litigants to "follow procedures
different from those set forth." See infra app. § 1.2(c).
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provide a judge with an effective evidentiary procedure to construe
claims as a matter of law. This is precisely what is needed to make
the process more efficient as well as expeditious. 35 Hopefully,
the format of these local rules will be adopted by other district
courts as well, so that the parties and judges can begin a claim
construction hearing fully apprised of all relevant material.
V EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO A TRIAL JUDGE DURING A
MARKMAN HEARING
For a trial judge to construe a patent's claims during a
Markman Hearing, both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence will be
admitted. 36 The Federal Circuit in Markman first defined intrin-
sic evidence3 3 and reiterated that a trial judge must rely on such
13' For a general discussion of the underlying policy concerns associatedwith
a rigid discovery process and a subsequent claim construction hearing, see supra
notes 115-16.
36 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1573, 1576 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (noting that there are two kinds of evidence in patent litigation). Even
though admittance of extrinsic evidence, such as expert testimony, is discretion-
ary by a judge, a judge will likely accept the aid of such evidence at a Markman
Hearing because the hearing is usually held for that very purpose. See Viskase
Corp. v. American Nat'l Can Co., No. 93-C-7651, 1996 WL 3777054, at *1
(N.D. III. 1996) (deciding to hold a "separate evidentiary hearing on the
Markman issues" and allowing a party to present at the hearing three technical
experts). Otherwise, the judge could have construed the claims just on the paper
record. See supra notes 81, 84-88 (discussing the alternative of construing a
patent's claims merely from a paper record).
117 52 F.3d 967, 979-80 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (explaining the well-established
forms of intrinsic evidence available to a trial judge in order to interpret the
meaning of patent claims). As the Federal Circuit defined "intrinsic evidence,"
a trial judge must first look to the "claims [themselves], the specification, and the
prosecution history" when determining the meaning of claim terms. Id. at 979
(quoting Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1561 (Fed. Cir.
1991)). See Vitronics, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1576 ("[I]ntrinsic evidence is the most
significant source of the legally operative meaning of disputed claim language.").
This evidence cannot "enlarge, diminish, or vary the limitations in the claims."
Markman, 52 F.3d at 981. Additionally, the terms in a patent's claims are usually
given their ordinary and customary meaning. Vitronics, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1576
("'A technical term used in a patent document is interpreted as having the
meaning that it would be given by persons experienced in the field of the
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evidence before depending on any extrinsic evidence. 3 ' Then, the
court defined extrinsic evidence in a manner that blurred the
usefulness of expert testimony. 139 The Supreme Court subse-
quently attempted to refine the analysis. 4 '
invention.. . ."') (quoting Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d
1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 275 (1996)). However, the
patentee is "free to be his own lexicographer" and, thus, a judge must view the
definition of terms in light of the patent's specification. Markman, 52 F.3d at
980. The reason for referring to a patent's specification is that it is a written
description of the invention that must allow a person of "ordinary skill in the art
to make and use [the invention]." Vitronics, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1577. This written
description can act as a "dictionary" to explain the invention and define claim
terms. Markman, 52 F.3d at 979-80. Thus, the patent specification is relied on
by courts as a key means of defining terms in a patent.
[T~he specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction
analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the
meaning of a disputed term.
Vitronics, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1577.
In addition to the claims themselves and the specification, a judge should
consider a patent's prosecution history, if admitted as evidence. Markman, 52
F.3d at 980 (discussing the role of the prosecution history in determining the
construction of a claim). The prosecution history is considered the "undisputed
public record" of the proceeding before the Patent and Trademark Office. Id. It
serves as a highly relevant source in determining the meaning of terms in the
claims because a patentee expressly states the scope of the invention during the
prior proceeding. Id (citing Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, 102 U.S.
222, 227 (1880)).
"' 52 F.3d at 983 (declaring that extrinsic evidence cannot be relied on
because the patent document itself and the prosecution history clearly define the
meaning of the claim's terms).
"' Id. at 981 (defining what extrinsic evidence a trial judge can consider, yet
stating that ajudge cannot make credibility determinations or weigh any extrinsic
evidence). See infra notes 143-153 and accompanying text (analyzing the
inefficiency of a de novo review by the Federal Circuit when credibility
determinations and evidence weighing has necessarily occurred at the trial stage).
140 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1395 (1996)
(clarifying the Federal Circuit's opinion by stating that credibility determinations
will occur, but they will be "subsumed" within the proper construction of the
entire document). See infra notes 143-53 and accompanying text (agreeing with
the Supreme Court's admission that credibility determinations will be made by
trial judges, yet pointing out the lack of deference to these judges and, thus, the
ultimate waste of judicial resources).
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Under the Federal Circuit's approach, once a judge evaluates all
the intrinsic evidence and concludes that there is still an ambiguity
in a patent claim, the judge can then admit extrinsic evidence.' 4'
However, this evidence may be used by a judge only to aid in his
or her understanding of "scientific principles, . . . technical terms,
and terms of art that appear in the patent or prosecution his-
tory.' 42 In sum, the main role of extrinsic evidence is to assist
a judge in understanding the subject matter of a patent's claims and
to clear up any ambiguities.
A practical question arises as to how a court separates the use
of extrinsic evidence solely in understanding the subject matter of
the public record from the court's inadvertent reliance on such
evidence when actually construing the claims. 43 The answer is
14' Extrinsic evidence is any evidence that is not in a patent itself or in the
prosecution history, such as "expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and
learned treatises." Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. See Vitronics, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at
1577 (explaining that when a patent's claims, specification, and prosecution
history unambiguously define the disputed terms, extrinsic evidence cannot be
relied on by a judge). See also Markman, 52 F.3d at 978-79 (stating that it is
"only fair (and statutorily required) that a competitor be able to ascertain [from
the patent document and the prosecution history alone] to a reasonable degree the
scope of a patentee's right to exclude," without worrying whether the scope will
be changed by future use of extrinsic evidence).
142 Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. Moreover, the Federal Circuit in Markman
reiterated the already established principle that extrinsic evidence cannot vary or
contradict a patent's claims, specification or prosecution history. Id. at 981
(citing U.S. Indus. Chems., Inc. v. Carbide & Carbon Chems. Corp., 315 U.S.
668, 678 (1942)). See Vitronics, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1579 (finding that the trial
court used extrinsic evidence incorrectly to vary the meaning of claim terms
because the patent's specification unambiguously defined the terms).
Remarkably, the Federal Circuit has recently admitted that instances can
occur when ajudge cannot interpret the meaning of the claim terms from looking
at the public record and, therefore, the judge can rely on expert testimony for the
claim construction. Id. Such instances, in which extrinsic evidence plays a
dominant and pivotal role in claim construction, raise a substantial policy issue.
See infra notes 143-53 and accompanying text (discussing the inefficiency in
having a trial judge's claim construction reviewed de novo when credibility
determinations have necessarily been made, but advancing the need to hold such
appeals shortly thereafter to circumvent at least some of the resources wasted).
143 For an example of a judge mistakenly relying on the claim interpretation
of one of the parties after hearing extrinsic evidence, see Exxon Chem. Patents,
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unclear, and, as a result, a dilemma arises with the use of one type
of extrinsic evidence: expert testimony.144
Trial judges hear expert testimony in most patent infringement
cases to assist the court in understanding technical and convoluted
material. Such testimony is relevant to a judge's ultimate claim
construction. Appreciating its popular use by many trial judges, the
Federal Circuit stated that the court "has complete discretion to
adopt the expert legal opinion as its own, to find guidance from it,
or to ignore it entirely, or even to exclude it.' 45 As a direct
result of this discretion, trial judges who hear such expert testimony
have stated that credibility determinations are made along with the
weighing of conflicting testimony. 46 Therefore, a resentment has
grown among these judges toward the Federal Circuit because it
offers no deference to the judge's assessment of the weight of the
testimony that leads to their claim construction.
147
Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
14' The problem of ignoring a trial judge's credibility determinations and
evidence weighing begins with a judge's use of expert testimony, but does not
actually culminate into a problem until the claim construction reaches the
appellate level, where the Federal Circuit must review the construction de novo.
For a discussion of this dilemma and an obvious solution, see infra notes 145-53
and accompanying text.
"' Markman, 52 F.3d at 981. See Re & Jennings, supra note 90, at 888-99
(examining the Federal Circuit's position on the use of expert testimony).
146 See, e.g., Lucas Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unison Indus., L.P., 890 F. Supp. 329,
333 n.7 (D. Del. 1995) (proclaiming that a judge makes credibility determina-
tions and weighs evidence whenever he or she adopts the meaning of a claim
term proffered by a party's expert or, alternatively, decides to reject all expert
opinions about the definition of a claim term); Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor
Co. of Japan, Ltd., 906 F. Supp. 798, 809, 810 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (referring
to witness demeanor as having "great reticence and equivocation" and being
"argumentative" and "obviously geared to the outcome of the litigation").
147 Lucas Aerospace, 890 F. Supp. at 333 n.7. As Judge Murray M. Schwartz
stated in Lucas Aerospace:
If those possessed of a higher commission wish to rely on a cold
written record and engage in de novo review of all claim constructions,
that is their privilege. . . . [B]ound by slavish adherence to the fiction
that a judge does not make credibility determinations when confronted
with testimonial extrinsic evidence en route to pronouncing the "true"
meaning of a patent claim, this opinion has been crafted in a manner
that leaves the reader, and the reviewing court, uninformed as to the
759
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of credibility determina-
tions and the weight of expert testimony by stating that "[i]t is...
true that credibility judgments have to be made about the experts
who testify in patent cases .... [but i]n the main ... any [such]
credibility determinations will be subsumed within the necessarily
sophisticated analysis of the whole document . . . .""' However,
as the Federal Circuit admitted in V4tronics Corp. v Conceptronics,
Inc.,149 when a trial judge is unable to determine the meaning of
the terms from the "patent documents, taken as a whole," a judge
may rely on expert testimony. 50 Thus, while the Supreme Court
minimized the significance of any credibility determinations with
respect to expert testimony, the Federal Circuit admitted that such
testimony may at times play an essential role in a judge's claim
interpretation.
credibility assessments which, as always, are necessary precursors to
the acceptance or rejection of testimonial evidence from competing
experts.
Id. (emphasis added).
48 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1395 (1996).
See Markman, 52 F.3d at 981 (stating that a judge is "not crediting certain
evidence over other evidence or making factual evidentiary findings").
149 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
o Id. at 1578-79. "No doubt there will be instances in which intrinsic
evidence is insufficient to enable the court to determine the meaning of the
asserted claims, and in those instances, extrinsic evidence, such as [expert
testimony] ... may also properly be relied on ... to construe the claims." Id.
See Robert Gurrola, CAFC Rules Extrinsic Evidence May Not Vary or Contradict
Unambiguous Patent Claims, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Aug. 1, 1996, at 7873,
available in 1996 WL 427608 (summarizing Vitronics, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1573). In
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., the court notes that this situation "will
rarely, if ever, occur." 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1579. The court was merely making a
hollow assumption about how frequently district courts will rely on expert
testimony and offered no further support for its statement. In reality, such
reliance can occur, and when it does the Federal Circuit ignores the judge's time-
consuming weighing of evidence and credibility determinations. See, e.g., Loral
Fairchild, 906 F. Supp. at 802 (noting that the paper record was insufficient to
construe the patent's claims and, as a result, each side was permitted to have two
expert witnesses testify at the Markman Hearing to assist the court with the claim
construction).
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Consequently, when a trial judge relies on expert testimony and
makes pivotal decisions about the weight of that testimony,
necessarily including credibility determinations, the Federal Circuit
overlooks it in its de novo review of the paper record.'
Therefore, a trial judge who admits expert testimony during a
Markman Hearing may be inadvertently engaging in inefficient
behavior that seriously impedes the role of a trial judge.'52
Besides the presence of such a dilemma with expert testimony,
a Markman Hearing should be held before trial and coupled with
'5 See, e.g., Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553,
1556 (Fed. Cir. 1995) "No matter when or how a judge performs the Markman
task, on appeal we review the issue of claim interpretation independently without
deference to the trial judge." Id. (emphasis added).
15' This is not the only situation that exemplifies such inadvertent and
inefficient behavior of a trial judge. But see infra notes 172-74 and accompany-
ing text (noting how judicial resources can be saved by having an immediate
appellate review following a Markman Hearing). It is irrelevant whether a trial
judge is relying on expert witnesses because the public record is insufficient or
merely using the testimony to help understand the complex material. In either
situation, the judge is arguably making credibility determinations and weighing
evidence that will be ignored by an appellate court during its de novo review of
the paper record. See supra notes 143-51 and accompanying text (exploring the
controversial issue that the Federal Circuit offers trial judges no deference).
The purpose of implementing a vast amount ofjudicial resources to construe
a patent's claims with the help of expert witnesses must be questioned, due to the
likelihood of an ensuing appeal. See infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text
(offering an obvious antidote: having an immediate appellate review as soon as
a trial judge construes a patent's claims). As a result of the lack of deference to
a trial judge and a trial judge's questionable role in the claim construction
process, a "prominent practitioner has even suggested that a new appellate arm
be created to hear claim construction questions ... [in order to] bypass a district
court's interpretation." Hoffman & Wasleff, supra note 3, at 21 (footnote
omitted).
[N]either the [Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit] nor the
Supreme Court has chosen to heed the Court's previous assertion that
the trial is the 'main event' rather than just a 'tryout on the road' to
later appellate review.
Gregory D. Leibold, Comment, In Juries We Do Not Trust: Appellate Review of
Patent-Infringement Litigation, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 623, 625 (citing Anderson
v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,
90 (1977)).
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a quick appellate review of the claim construction in order to
circumvent any further inefficiency that may result from proceeding
via a wrong construction. 5 3 Realizing the possibility that there
was an improper construction and also that trial judges will at times
use evidence in a manner that the Federal Circuit will not appreci-
ate in its de novo review, a pre-trial hearing in all patent litigations
may conserve a far greater amount of judicial resources than if
claim construction occurred after weeks or months of trial.
VI. THE POTENTIAL INCREASE IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT MOTIONS AND INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS AS A
RESULT OF MARKMAN
The Federal Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that "'summary
judgment is as appropriate in a patent case as in any other,""' .54
and that "it is no longer debatable that the issues in a patent case
are subject to summary judgment."'55 Historically, however,
summary judgment motions were not recognized in patent litiga-
tion. 5 6 The primary reasoning of these courts was that a patent's
'13 For a discussion of why appeals should be freely granted by the courts,
see infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
'4 Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (quoting Spectra Corp. v. Lutz, 839 F.2d 1579, 1581 n.6 (Fed. Cir.
1988)).
' Id. The Supreme Court has stated that the function of a summary
judgment motion is to determine "whether there is the need for a trial-whether,
in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved
only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of
either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
Following the Anderson decision, a commentator stated that "[i]t is important to
see, whether ... the legal system gives too little credence to [the summary
judgment] device that has the potential for providing just results.., and which
could leave judicial resources free to concentrate on those actions for which a
trial is required." Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There
Been a Material Change in Standards?, 63 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 770, 771
(1988). Granting a summary judgment motion for such purposes is equally
applicable to the context of patent litigation because the necessity for holding a
trial will be eliminated and efficiency goals will be effectuated.
56 See, e.g., Continuous Curve Contact Lenses, Inc. v. Rynco Scientific
Corp., 680 F.2d 605, 606 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that the U.S. Court of Appeals
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claims contained issues of fact.'57 Markman, in holding that
patent claim construction is a pure question of law for the court,
has dispelled any lingering doubts about whether patent claims are
to be characterized as posing factual issues. 5 Thus, trial judges
today will be increasingly confronted with both summary judgment
motions"' and partial summary judgment motions16  on the
issues of infringement and claim construction.' 6' If a summary
judgment motion is granted, the nonmoving party can then attempt
to appeal the trial judge's decision to the Federal Circuit. 162
for the Ninth Circuit has been "unsympathetic to summary judgments in patent
cases"). See also Steven D. Glazer & Steven J. Rizzi, Markman: The Supreme
Court Takes Aim at Patent Juries, 5 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 2, 4 (1996) (exploring
the use of summary judgment motions and noting that such motions were
disfavored historically).
'15 See, e.g., Continuous Curve Contact Lenses, 680 F.2d at 606 (citing
Garter-Bare Co. v. Mungsingwear, Inc., 650 F.2d 975 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 980 (1984)). See also Glazer & Rizzi, supra note 156, at 4
(stating that patent claims were thought to contain "factual underpinnings").
158 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1387 (1996).
"9 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
160 See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(d). Upon making a summary judgment motion,
a party instead may be granted partial summary judgment if the court determines
that there are still genuine issues of material fact and that it would be "practi-
cable to ... simplify the trial ... [by] issu[ing] an order that specifies the facts
that appear without substantial controversy." 1OA CHARLEs A. WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2737 (1983). Because such a ruling under
Federal Rule 56(d) is on less than an entire case, it is not considered to be a
"final and appealable judgment." Id. Moreover, for a party to be granted partial
summary judgment, a party must motion a court for summary judgment on the
entire case because "[t]here is no such thing as an independent motion under
Rule 56(d)." Arado v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp., 626 F. Supp. 506, 509
(N.D. Ill. 1985).
161 Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 894 F. Supp. 844,
857 (D. Del. 1995) (observing that as a result of Markman, "parties will now
routinely move for the early resolution of the claim construction issue" by
making a summary judgment motion); Kenneth E. Krosin & Timothy R. DeWitt,
En Banc Decisions of the Federal Circuit, in WINNING STRATEGIES IN PATENT
LITIGATION, supra note 90, at 831, 848 (stating that the Markman decision has
"encouraged parties to file summary judgment motions on the issue of claim
construction" and, hopefully, trial judges will in turn grant the motions).
162 Title 28 Interlocutory Decisions provides in pertinent part:
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As earlier stated, the analysis of an infringement action entails
two steps.'63 Markman has held that the first step, the claim
construction, is for a judge to decide as a matter of law;1 64
whereas the second step, the comparison between an allegedly
infringing device and a patent's claims, remains within the province
of a jury.165 Accordingly, to determine whether the court should
grant summary judgment on the infringement issue or, alternatively,
grant only partial summary judgment on the claim construction
issue, it must carefully ascertain the nature and operation of the
allegedly infringing device. 166
If the "nature [and operation] of the accused device is
clear" '167 and, thus, no factual dispute arises about it, a judge
arguably has the obligation to dispose of the infringement issue
through a summary judgment motion. 168 In this situation, because
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have
exclusive jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a judgment in a civil
action for patent infringement which would otherwise be appealable to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and is final
except for an accounting.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2) (emphasis added).
63 See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (discussing the two steps
and the corresponding role of a judge and jury).
164 See supra notes 39-41, 44-47 and accompanying text (noting that claim
construction is within the sole province of a court and, as a result, the holding
of a Markman Hearing has become a frequent procedural step in patent
infringement litigation).
"6' See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (stating that historical
precedent and the Seventh Amendment support a jury's role in determining the
ultimate question of literal infringement).
166 See infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text (dealing with factual
disputes, and the lack of factual disputes, in the nature and operation of a
defendant's device).
167 Michael A. Lechter, Simplifying Patent Infringement Litigation, WASH.
TECH., Apr. 27, 1995, at 23.
168 Id. (noting that when the "only issue is whether the scope of specific
claim language includes the accused device, it is now more likely that a trial, and
the accompanying expenses, may be avoided by summary judgment"); Charles
W. Bradley, The Changing Role of Juries in Patent Litigation, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW INSTITUTE 1995, at 113, 151 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 416, 1995)
(discussing that when "there is no dispute as to the construction or operation of
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there is no "genuine issue as to any material fact," '169 a judge will
only have remaining the construction of the patent's claims, which
will be decided as a matter of law. Therefore, a judge's claim
construction will be dispositive of whether infringement occurred
because a reasonable jury could not find for the nonmoving party
due to the uncontested nature of the accused device, and the judge
must therefore grant the summary judgment motion. 170
On the other hand, a court may be faced with an allegedly
infringing device whose nature and operation is not clearly
understood by the court or stipulated to by the parties. A factual
dispute will have arisen and the judge's claim construction will not
be dispositive of the infringement issue. However, pursuant to the
unequivocal Supreme Court holding in Markman, a judge arguably
should grant a partial summary judgment motion in which the
patent's claims are construed and have only the infringement
question remain for a jury.171
the accused device," a judge can dispose of a case through the granting of a
summary judgment motion). See Krosin & DeWitt, supra note 161, at 848
(noting the often dispositive nature of claim construction and, thus, its role in
deciding many cases in the summary judgment phase of a litigation).
169 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
170 See JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE: EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS 294 (2d ed. 1992) (explaining that the nonmoving party merely
has to show that a reasonable jury could find in its favor). If the nonmoving
party fails to show that a reasonable jury could find in its favor, then the judge
must grant the summary judgment motion because "a verdict for [that party]
could only reflect irrational decision-making." Id. "Summary judgment avoids
this risk, as well as the delay and expense of trying unprovable cases." Id.
' The Federal Rules mandate that "if on motion under [Federal Rule 56]
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case ... the court ... shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and
what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted." FED. R. Civ. P.
56(d).
If a Markman Hearing was not called sua sponte by the court before the
summary judgment motion was made, the court will likely hold such a hearing
upon its receipt. Once the claims are construed through the use of the hearing
and the partial summary judgment is granted, the parties will be in an excellent
posture to consider settlement. Glazer & Rizzi, supra note 156, at 4-5.
[E]ven in those instances where construction of the claims is not
dispositive as a matter of law of the entire case-with triable issues
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After a patent's claims are construed, the dispositive nature of
the ruling exists throughout the entire trial.17 Thus, most claim
constructions by trial judges will be appealed by the aggrieved
party at the end of a litigation. To circumvent the possibility of
devoting judicial resources to litigation proceeding under improper
claim construction, a court should exercise its discretion and freely
grant interlocutory appeals. 73 The prime time for granting this
remaining-the parties frequently will reach settlement upon the
court's providing its interpretation of the patent.
Glazer & Rizzi, supra note 156, at 4. The probability of turning away from
litigation and into a settlement agreement will be greatly increased because both
parties know what the jury will be told in the judge's instructions about the
meaning of the patent's claims and, as a result, which party the claim construc-
tion favors. Glazer & Rizzi, supra note 156, at 5 (noting that after the claims are
construed, it might not be worth the risk or cost to proceed with trial). Therefore,
both parties can fairly predict their chances of success.
72 See supra note 4 (noting the pivotal role claim construction often plays
in determining which party ultimately will be victorious following a jury's
verdict).
' Title 28 Interlocutory Appeals states in pertinent part that a district court
judge should grant an interlocutory order when the judge is
of the opinion that such [interlocutory] order involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference
of opinion and that an immediate appeal. . . may materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation ....
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (emphasis added). See Hoffman & Wasleff, supra note 3,
at 20-21 (commenting briefly on the reasons why a court should grant
interlocutory appeals, such as to guide discovery requests, depositions and
improve trial strategies); Scheinfeld, supra note 99, at 9 (advocating the use of
interlocutory appeals when factual disputes exist about the nature of the accused
device).
Historically, interlocutory appeals have been rarely granted by the courts.
"[U]nless the Federal Circuit sees its role differently from other appellate courts,
it is unlikely to take such discretionary appeals as a matter of course." Hoffman
& Wasleff, supra note 3, at 20. One commentator has enumerated four reasons
why the granting of interlocutory appeals will probably not become common
practice. Pegram, supra note 89, at 568. First, it is very unlikely that a trial judge
will admit that "'there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion' on a
claim construction that he or she believes to be correct. Pegram, supra note 89,
at 568 (citation omitted). Second, trial judges may not feel that an appeal will
"'materially advance the termination of the litigation."' Pegram, supra note 89,
at 568 (citation omitted). Third, by granting an interlocutory appeal, any attempts
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appeal would be immediately following a Markman Hearing so that
the Federal Circuit can review the claim construction de novo and
the litigation at the district court can thereafter proceed via the
proper construction. This will give both parties their "two full bites
at the apple" '174 early in the litigation.
CONCLUSION
Markman is a landmark decision. The procedural consequences
of the decision are numerous and will continue to evolve. However,
once these positive procedural shock waves are appreciated and
exploited fully, the result will be a more efficient and expeditious
patent litigation system. Markman has set the stage for district
courts to more actively implement such policy concerns. The
Federal Circuit, however, must be willing to increase its docket
activity earlier in any given litigation through interlocutory appeals
in order to derive the full benefits of the Markman Hearing.
to settle might be delayed until the appeal has concluded. Pegram, supra note 89,
at 568. Fourth, "the Court of Appeals is not required to accept such an appeal."
Pegram, supra note 89, at 568.
However, Markman presents the courts with an excellent opportunity to
start implementing this powerful procedural tool due to its ability to prevent
litigation under the wrong claim construction. In addition, the district courts have
become alert to the possible increased use of interlocutory appeals. See, e.g., Elf
Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 894 F. Supp. 844, 857 (D.
Del. 1995) (noting that litigants will seek an "immediate interlocutory appeal
[following a Markman Hearing] to avoid the possibility of dual trials should the
Federal Circuit reverse the trial court's claim construction"). By granting these
appeals, courts would be taking a direct policy stand in promoting efficiency. As
a result, the Federal Circuit's docket will undeniably increase. This, however,
should not be the underlying factor for denying the appeals. Rather, the
interlocutory appeal should be viewed as a means of hastening an inevitable
appeal by the party whom the claim was originally construed against.
... Re & Jennings, Supra note 90, at 900.
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